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LAW, THE FREE PEOPLES, AND INTERNATIONAL
PEACE.*
WILLIAM GORHAM RICE t
PEACE, at least international peace, it has often been said, is in-
divisible. However much we are many nations, we are one world.
However strongly we may feel that the world is half slave and half
free, by the compulsion of geography and the invention of science, it
is inescapably one world.
No dissatisfied segment of humanity can depart from this Earth
by migration-at least not yet. The lawyers as well as astronauts are
beginning to think about the law that rules men when they move into
outer space. Let me mention the article of the Assistant Director
General of the I.L.O., Mr. C. Wilfred Jenks, in the International and
Comparative Law Quarterly a year ago, entitled "International Law
and Activities in Space", and the pioneering of Andrew G. Haley,
general counsel of the American Rocket Society, in what he calls
"metalaw", that is, in his words, "the law governing the rights of
intelligent beings of different natures and existing in an indefinite
number of different frameworks of natural law."
No part of humanity, then, can for an inestimable future escape
the rest of humanity except by destroying it. This choice, however, is
one that we are all resolved not to make, however strong our hostility
to the ways of some nations; although we hear an occasional voice
raised in favor of a "preventive war" meaning a war of enslavement or
annihilation. Neither in personal relations nor in international rela-
tions is extermination or enslavement a debatable alternative to coexist-
ence, least of all is it debatable among those who profess the law.
Today between the free peoples there is an almost universally expressed
and acclaimed ambition to achieve sure peace, peace that is more than
the absence of war, peace that is the art of living together whether we
like or dislike those with whom we have to live.
* A paper delivered at the School of Law, Villanova University, April 25, 1957
as part of a symposium on "International Peace" held on the occasion of the dedica-
tion of Garey Hall, the Law School building.
t Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. A.B. 1914, A.M.1915, LL.B. 1920, S.J.D. 1921, Harvard University.
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Why is the problem one of the living together of nations rather
than of persons, when it is not crowns or states but people that are
our real concern? For our purposes we might answer, "because inter-
national peace is what we are discussing." But that is a postponement
not an answer; it only leads to a renewal of the fundamental question
but now in the form: why is international peace a problem quite
different from that of peace between persons or families or churches;
why is international peace a problem entirely distinct from interracial
or industrial peace. The answer is not that loyalty to race or loyalty
to an industrial group is never as strong as loyalty to one's nation.
In past centuries have we not seen thousands whose loyalty to kings
by alleged divine right was stronger than loyalty to the nation? Have
we not seen more recently tens of thousands preaching class warfare
and overthrow of social institutions by violence? Have we not seen
hundreds of thousands whose loyalty to church or race (sometimes in
combination), wrongly expressed in disdain, if not hatred, of some
other religion or people, has led to extreme cruelty, to slavery, to
apartheid in South Africa, to mob conflict between Moslems and
Hindus a few years ago in India, to Crusades and other so-called wars
of religion, to inquisitions and oppressions and lynchings, that have
undermined, divided, even destroyed nations that had not developed
sufficient cohesion to withstand these terrible waves of devotion to
intolerant aims related to race or religion?
No, the difference between international peace and the peace that
is needed in industrial and in race relations is in the garment of law
that clothes the nation, a garment in part made of organized physical
power.
The combination of standards and force to compel the observance
of the standards is now the monopoly of what the political scientists
call the state, that is, the people rooted in a geographic area bound
together by political ties of nationality, ties of public law, whatever their
race, religion, or industrial status. These ties are the core of law.
Each nation-a term I prefer to state-requires of its nationals, and
of those assimilated partly and temporarily to its nationality by coming
within its frontiers, obedience to its rule. It is the rule plus the com-
pulsion that distinguishes law from other social controls. It is the
rule of law making the force orderly, and presumptively, just that
distinguishes the force of the state from the force-of a mob.
Law governs not only the relations between man and nation but
also the relations between group and group and between man and man
within each nation. Thus the problem of industrial and interracial
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peace becomes, in an important part, a problem of making proper law
and thereby accomplishing incidentally an orderly application of force
to assure the freedom of permitted conduct and to prevent successful
use of force in other ways.
Force has two strong arms-the arm of the murderer and the
arm that stays the arm of the murderer, the strength that is riotous
and the strength that guards the prisoner, the armament that violates
the adolescent body of international law and the armament that, whether
wielded by a nation or by a world authority, defends, fortifies and
develops the growing body of international law, the bludgeon of in-
justice and the tool of justice. Force well-wielded removes mountains,
dams rivers, builds good societies of men, and force ill-used builds
Chinese walls and iron curtains, enslaves peoples, and today could
swiftly annihilate mankind.
It is nations that monopolize organized force. Within each nation
this force is an aspect of a legal order more or less friendly to justice,
an order which we can firmly believe will bring forth good fruits, if
it is fertilized by knowledge, watered by prophetic vision, and firmly
rooted in popular will. But between nations law not only lacks
assurance of the companionship of force, but the weight of organized
force may even be aligned against it. Even if the law of nations were
clear, and of course it is often obscure, it faces nations able to flout it.
Thus internationally we live in a perpetually unstable equilibrium,
unstable not only because international law is immature but chiefly
because it lacks means to overcome the organized forceful opposition
with which any nation or combination of nations may defy its
standards.
There is nothing novel in saying that international law is im-
mature because it lacks sanctions, or that international institutions of
government-courts to apply law, legislatures to change law, and a
big stick to enforce law, are all needed to assure the rule of law
between nations. The problem is how, and how fast can good leader-
ship of popular opinion achieve them.
I was struck by what Professor Louis Sohn of the Harvard Law
School said recently in describing his course on UN Law. "The
course", he said, "is concerned with the mysterious process of creation
of new law . . . with investigation of the process of legal growth",
and he remarks, "there is hardly a parallel in history for the amazing
growth of the UN since 1945; it compares favorably even with the
development of the United States in the first twelve years of its
existence"-that is, the 12 years from 1776.
[VOL. 3 : p.. 40
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Mr. Sohn spoke of the earliest years of the United States, those
years in which our union was as shaky, after the pressure of the
Revolutionary War was over, as the UN sometimes appears to be today.
But the clamor of every nation, old or new, to enter the organization of
nations proves its significance. However much it may seem a fool's
paradise if we judge it by its immediate success in replacing war and
the threats of war by law and the enforcement of law, the UN is a
complete success if we appraise it by the many who wish to join and
the none who wish to resign, even though they sulk in their tents from
time to time. We need to recall the setbacks of our own vision, events
not only of the dozen years before the framing of the Constitution
but of the whole first century of our nationhood, the failures of
law between states-such as the flouting of law by Georgia in ignoring
the decrees of the Supreme Court and by the President in refusing to
enforce them when the Cherokee Indians were brutally driven west;
and the epic failure of law that was the four years' war between the
states. Yet today within the United States we live in a house of law,
confident that it can not be torn down from the inside.
In contrast, to prepare to meet the use of force by other nations
we expend our wealth in evanescent armament. The transformation of
the loose league of revolting American colonies of Great Britain in
1776 into the union of 1789 that was effected by the adoption of the
Constitution seems to me less revealing of what we may strive for or
expect to occur between nations than the pattern of another union.Ours was an almost miraculous jump. We can not, now, imagine that
anything like it will occur between nations more diverse than were
our 13 states. So I turn to another country whose development was
slow but, in the large, constant as it progressed from a revolutionary
league to a nation. In the twentieth century, however, the sort of
progress that it took centuries to make, might be compressed into
decades, so fast is social change today.
I speak of Switzerland, which grew by accretion of city and
country groups, each proud of its individuality and independence, but
learning by experience to appreciate more highly its interdependence
with its neighbors. From the Pact of Riitli of 1291 between three
Alpine valley communities rebelling against Hapsburg rulers, a pact
prophetically self-styled an "everlasting alliance", these forest cantons
bordering Lake Lucerne extended individually or jointly the bonds of
alliance to other urban and rural political units within the German
or Holy Roman Empire. Later, by wars against the Dukes of Milan
on the south and the Kings of Burgundy and of Savoy on the west,
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Italian and French-speaking people, as subject folk in the earlier
period but eventually as partners, came within the Swiss complex. In
this checkered story of alliances and military struggle, the great ad-
vances, the inclusion of Zurich, of Bern, and later of Basel, were made
by voluntary agreement, usually to face a common enemy.
In the late fifteenth century, rivalry between urban and rural
cantons in disputes over the admission of new members, threatened
the integrity of the Confederacy. At the Diet of Stans in 1481 when
it seemed probable that the failure of all attempts to come to an under-
standing would result in the disruption of the League, the mediation
of Nicholaus von der Flie (Bruder Klaus, as he often is called), a holy
hermit of Sachseln in Obwalden, succeeded in bringing both sides to
reason and the Pact of Stans was agreed on. New pledges of
mutual assistance and standards for division of war booty and for
government of conquered territory wer set up, and Fribourg (a
French-speaking city) and Solothurn were admitted to the Confederacy.
In the next century cleavage between town and country was
succeeded by an equally bitter, largely coinciding, struggle between
religious regulars and religious dissenters.
But even during the Reformation, which struck heavily in Switzer-
land, especially in the cities, under the leadership of Zwingli in Zurich
and under the stimulus of Calvin at Geneva (then an independent
city-nation), the Swiss Confederation did not fall apart. Before it
was thus deeply divided and politically weakened, it had fully estab-
lished its practical independence from the Holy Roman Empire in 1499.
It maintained it, and despite the turmoil of the following century and
the frightful war that decimated Germany in the seventeenth century,
Switzerland, now comprising -thirteen cantons, abandoned all policy of
conquest. It was absorbed in internal religious struggles that repeatedly
broke into intercantonal warfare. But this warfare was moderated
by some sense of continuing confederacy. The armed struggles be-
tween the Catholic and the Protestant cantons-an outward con-
formity in religious allegiance of the people of each canton was
the prevailing practice-were relieved by truces, by fissions of can-
tons, and by the common bond of administering the bailiwicks or
subject territories of the confederation, where some freedom, or at
least local option, of religious allegiance was allowed. Most notably
too, during internal hostilities, certain cantons were constantly mediat-
ing between belligerent neighbor cantons, and offers of peaceful inter-
vention to create understanding between enemies became an established
technique in intra-confederation relations, a precursor of the policy
[VOL. 3: p. 40
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of affirmative neutrality that characterizes Switzerland as a nation
today.
The Swiss Confederation, prior to its subjugation by Napoleon,
hardly had a government. It had a Diet, which was a continuous
diplomatic conference, a small-scale UN General Assembly, in which
met the representatives of powerful and of weak units, of Protestant and
of Catholic units, of units of German, French and Italian speech, to
consult concerning common interests, but without power to command
one another by any sort of majority vote. The basic law of Switzerland
at this period, says one Swiss historian, was "a formless conglomeration
of international compacts." Perhaps that is also a good description
of the relations of the free nations today.
But the increasing practice of mediation and arbitration as a
method of settling those intercantonal differences that were not dis-
sipated by direct negotiation or by discussion in the Diet, marked the
increasing will to abolish war between cantons. "Common to all the
intertwining treaties of alliance between the thirteen old cantons"-
those before Napoleon's instrusion-"is the principle that controversies
must be settled by arbitration in a manner binding on all members",
says Ernst Brand, the legal historian. Many of these treaties had
detailed provisions regarding such means of settlement; all required
the arbitrators to achieve settlement either by conciliation or, if that
failed, according to law, that is, according to international law, in-
cluding this elaborate fabric of treaties that tied the cantons to one
another, basically the same sort of law that the Swiss Federal Tribunal
applies today in the cases between cantons that it is constantly
deciding.
The late Judge John Bassett Moore remarks that it was "a
distinctive phase of Swiss arbitral procedure" of all sorts that arbitra-
tors should first attempt to achieve settlement by mediation, a practice,
one may note, that marks Swiss judicial administration even today. It
was only if mediation did not produce agreement, that the abritrator or
group of arbitrators was bound to decide and then to decide by law.
Emil Usteri, another Swiss historian, writing of Swiss arbitration,
again referring not specifically to intercantonal arbitration, says:
"The arbitral tribunal on Swiss soil, besides the friendly pro-
cedure (Minneverfahren) of mediation proper and the legal set-
tlement (Rechtsspruch) also knew and used the equitable settle-
ment (Minnespruch), that is, the award based on considerations of
fairness (Billigkeit)",
but of course only with the parties' consent. William Bross Lloyd, an
American member of the Religious Society of Friends, who has studied
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deeply the history of political mediation in Switzerland and has gath-
ered his learning into a book (still unpublished) called "Swiss Experi-
ence of Waging Peace" says similarly of political intervention by
cantons:
"Two general lines of procedure were developed by the cantons;
disputes were settled either 'in Minne,' meaning literally in love,
connoting a process of friendly compromise embracing conciliation
and mediation, or 'in Recht', namely by arbitration under the pacts
between cantons."
Between these two solutions a Minnespruch was also possible if the
parties requested it-a final decision like a Rechtsspruch, but a decision
made by love rather than by law, or, as it is called in the Statute of ICJ
of this century, a decision ex aequo et bono.
These institutional methods were expressed in a wealth of Swiss
practice and pervaded all intercantonal treaties. They were the mortar
that held the pugnacious bricks together, too loosely to resist the inva-
sion of Napoleon, but strongly enough to prevent collapse during the
six preceding centuries.
In 1799 Napoleon set up the Helvetic Republic, a unified state.
But, though the French yoke was not removed until Napoleon's down-
fall, he re-established Swiss federalism by the so-called mediation of
1803, adding to the Republic at the same time three lesser leagues in the
southeastern frontier to form the polyglot canton of Graubjinden.
This federal regime imposed by France for a decade was, of course,
abandoned, when Switzerland regained its freedom. But, the looseness
of the old confederacy was not resumed, for its weakness in 1799 was
borne in mind. The new constitution, the Pact of 1815, created for the
first time a national army.
Perhaps the Swiss Confederation from 1815 to 1848 may be com-
pared to NATO today, a unit for certain military purposes, but still
without a government in any proper sense: no executive body; nothing
but the diplomatic conference of the Diet as a rudimentary legislature;
no judicial organ. There was no customs union of the cantons, no such
common market as is now in sight for the six west European nations
that comprise the Coal and Steel Community, which moreover alreadv
has specialized organs of legislation, adjudication, and execution. The
Diet was, however, given power to declare war and make treaties of
peace and alliance, provided the representatives of three-quarters of the
cantons concurred. Other treaties could be made both by the Diet and
by the cantons.
[VOL. 3: p. 40
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The number of cantons was raised, in 1815, to twenty-two by the
recognition of all previously subject territories as cantons, a French
innovation that persisted, and by acceptance to membership of Geneva
and other formerly independent political entities, and a national flag
was adopted.
Political turmoil in Europe in midcentury moved Switzerland to a
stronger union. A short civil war in 1848-the last organized fighting
that has occurred in Swiss territory-made the victors resolve to in-
crease central authority. The Pact of 1815 was replaced by the Con-
stitution of 1848, modeled more on that of the United States than on
that of any other country. It established a bi-cameral legislature with
substantial powers, a full-time executive council, and a supreme court.
The executive council and the court between them were empowered
to settle all intercantonal disputes. By an important constitutional revi-
sion in 1874, the court, previously manned by judges on per diem hire,
was reconstituted as a bench of full time judges elected by the legis-
lature and the court's powers were enlarged, particularly in the field
of intercantonal disputes. With the establishment of these permanent
bodies, arbitration between cantons has withered, but an ever firmer and
fuller intercantonal law has developed, molded by judicial decision, and
in recent years, much affected by federal legislation. Swiss intercan-
tonal litigation today is much greater in number of cases and in variety
of controversy than is interstate litigation in the United States Supreme
Court.
Here is a historical development which seems to me the best pro-
totype of what the free nations -can do in the building of peace between
one another. At least, some of them are at this work. Are we doing
our share?
Can we thus build an international peace that will embrace all
nations? An answer to this is not within the scope of the present dis-
cussion, but therein lies the truly difficult area, for international peace
is indivisible, and the development that took place between the varied
cantons of Switzerland, if it occurs only between the free nations, is,
after all, no large step toward international peace.
For a century the United States has not armed against Canada, nor
Canada against the United States. In this century we do not arm
against free countries nor they against us. But until this very month,
national armament, the barometer, not the enemy, but of international
peace, has given no sign of clearing weather between the free nations
and those behind the Iron Curtain.
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